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The Law of the American Constitution. By Charles K. Burdick. New York and
London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922. pp. xviii, 584.
This is the best brief but comprehensive work upon American federal constitu-
tional law that is now in print. In arrangement, clearness, and proportion it
merits high praise, and the publishers have presented it in attractive form. Where
helpful to a proper understanding of the scope or meaning of the provisions
of the Constitution a brief history of them is given, and references are made
to corresponding provisions in the Articles of Confederation and in some
instances to the fundamental acts of Canada and Australia. The work is
divided into thirty-three chapters, of which only nine are over 20 pages in
length, each disscussing a single topic or small group of related topics in a
manner intelligible to a layman, trustworthy to a lawyer, and satisfying to a
lover of good English. Many of the chapters are models of skillful and accurate
condensation, and of the hundreds of brief statements of law in the book there
are comparatively few that would be questioned by an exacting professional
critic. In some instances it seems to the reviewer that either the limits of a
doctrine or the reasons for it are stated more confidently than the authorities
warrant, and occasionally positive disagreement seems permissible; but it is of
course very difficult to deal with the more complicated parts of the subject both
accurately and concisely, and brevity no doubt has sometimes seemed the more
compelling need. The writer, however, would not agree that the Downes,
Mankichi, and Dorr cases "lead fairly to the conclusion that none of the guaran-
ties of the Second to the Eighth Amendments apply in unincorporated territories"
(pp. 301, 414-15), inasmuch as the prevailing judges in these cases all recognize
that the Constitution protects "fundamental" rights (which must certainly include
some of those enumerated in the Amendments) even in unincorporated territory.
So also the analysis of the situs problem in property taxes on choses in action
and succession taxes on chattels seems imperfect (pp. 412, 541-45). In all of
the federal cases where property taxes on debts at the home of the debtor were
upheld, the creditor did business there with these assets, and so made reasonable
their localization there on grounds similar to those which uphold the "unit rule"
in apportioning for property taxation the business values of a going concern
operating in several states. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds (1873, U. S.)
15 Wall. 300, seems still valid as to a mere debtor and creditor relation. A state
may consistently be forbidden to lay a property tax on the foreign chattels of
a resident owner, and still impose a valid succession tax on them-if, as is
customary, the state where the chattels actually are permits their devolution on
death to be controlled by the law of the domicile of the decedent, for the latter
state is then merely charging for giving a consent to a certain devolution that
it could in fact effectively forbid. If the state of the physical situs had manda-
tory rules governing the devolution of chattels at death, regardless of the law
of the domicile (as is true in some states in case of intestacy), it is conceived
that there would then (as in the case of foreign land) be nothing upon which
a succession tax at the domicile could operate. And it is too sweeping to say
that "a state may not tax directly a franchise granted by another state" (p. 537).
If it is to be exercised only in the foreign state, as a local ferry franchise, it
cannot be taxed elsewhere (Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky [19o3] 188
U. S. 385, 23 Sup. Ct. 463), but otherwise if it is exercised in the taxing state,
Western Union Telegraph Co. V. Missouri (1903) 190 U. S. 412, 23 Sup. Ct. 730.
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Nor should the decisions permitting taxation of foreign-held shares of a domes-
tic corporation at its place of business (Tappan v. Merchants' Bank [1873] I9
Wall. 49o) be criticised as based on an unsound analogy of ownership because
the claim of the stockholder is legally only a chose in action against the corpora-
tion (p. 542). Whatever the legal categories into which it is conventionally
convenient to classify corporate relationships, the fact is that ownership of
shares carries a species of control over corporate property which may be con-
stitutionally treated as ownership for reasonable purposes and within reasonable
limits, and taxation of the shares where the corporation is domiciled and does
business is within such purposes and limits. See also Rogers v. Hennepin (i96)
240 U. S. 184, 36 Sup. Ct. 265 (non-resident memberships in local chamber of
commerce taxable locally); San Mateo Co. v. Southern Pacific Ry. (1882) 13
Fed. 722, 743-47 (nature of shareholders' interest in corporate property).
In the author's brief discussion of the interstate privileges and immunities
clause of the original Constitution (Art. IV, sec. 2, par. I) a reader would gain
the impression that this clause secured to citizens of other states some specific
rights in a particular state (p. 483), and one may of course find numerous
statements of the same character made by courts. It is so clear, however, that
this clause merely forbids a state to discriminate against citizens of other states
(allowing it to treat them as badly as it pleases, if its own citizens are treated
the same) that it ought to be emphasized that this is its only office. It may be
thought also that Field's well-known opinion in Hagar v. Reclamation District
(1884) 1II U. S. 701, 709, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, is quoted somewhat uncritically to
indicate that property may be taken without notice and hearing by some kinds
of taxation and not by others (p. 547). It is believed that all varieties of taxa-
tion are on the same footing in this regard. A specific license tax of $2.00
each on vehicles, and an ad valorem tax of 2% on land alike require no notice
or hearing before enactment-that being a purely legislative function; but a con-
troversy as to the application of either requires notice and hearing before a
taxpayer can be finally mulcted-because this requires adjudication, a judicial
function. The taxpayer who denies that he owns a "vehicle" within the mean-
ing of the law must be heard before final action, as well as he who thinks tfie
assessor has overvalued his real estate. There is no real difference in principle
between the cases but merely a difference in the criterion of liability to taxation
laid down by the legislature. Whether one owns a vehicle or not is generally
so simple a question that the assessor may determine it without notice unless
the taxpayer specifically controverts it, while valuation of property is generally
so controversial that the hearing is usually given in advance of the assessment,
though due process is complied with if it is given only in proceedings to collect
the tax. Hagar v. Reclamation District, supra; Londoner v. Denver (igo8) 21o
U. S. 373, 385, 28 Sup. Ct 708, 713, 714. See a similar distinction regarding
necessity of a hearing in assessments for benefits, according to the likelihood
that they will or will not exceed cost, taken in Martin v. District of Columbia
(i9o7) 205 U. S. 135, 138-40, 27 Sup. Ct. 440, 441.
These references to a few debatable matters are made, not because such points
characterize the book-they do not, but on account of the professional interest in
such discussion that is shared by a large circle of readers of the work in common
with the author and the reviewer. It is a more grateful and appropriate duty
to call attention to the book's numerous excellences, among which may be men-
tioned the admirable chapters upon Interstate Rendition, Due Process in Eminent
Domain and the Police Power, and Equal Protection of the Laws. A number
of errors in proof-reading should be corrected in subsequent printings, and there
are a few important cases which might be added to the citations, such as Slocum
v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co. (1913) 228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523 (control of
findings of jury by appellate courts under Seventh Amendment) ; and Chicago,
220 YALE LAW JOURNAL
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm (1899) 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (full faith and
credit in foreign attachment cases); but it is a pleasure to be able to assert
that the book as a whole is one of the best written law books of recent years.
JAmEs PAR= HAm
University of Chicago Law School
The Development of International Law after the World War. By Otfried Nip-
pold, translated from the German by Amos S. Hershey. Oxford, (Humphrey
Milford) Oxford University Press, i9z3. pp. xv, 241.
This is one of the publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. The translator, Professor Hershey of Indiana University, will be remem-
bered as the author of an admirable treatise upon International Law. It is an
interesting and stimulating book. The author is a German but resident in
Switzerland during the war, a bitter critic of German militarism and of much
of the mass of opinion proceeding from German literati under the influence of
that militarism. Moreover, and this is to be constantly borne in mind, the book
was written in 1917, before the United States came in, before the Russian
Revolution took place, before the outcome of the war therefore could be
definitely foreseen.
It consists in the first place in a plea for a league of States which shall be so
organized and so powerful as to be able to substitute law and right for force in
the relations of States. To this are somewhat loosely added essays on the
laws of war, the interests of neutrals, the freedom of the seas. And finally
in an Appendix the author gathers League programs other than his own. The
author of course had access to the work of his German confrres during the war
and quotes freely matter which did not get circulation here. This is a noteworthy
feature.
Dr. James Brown Scott in his introductory note comments upon Professor
Nippold's League of Nations thus: "It was nothing'more or less than the League
of Nations in all its essentials, which as elaborated by the Peace Conference at
Paris appears as Part I in the Treaty with Germany and in all other treaties
concluding the war." Nippold himself remarks "that the problem of the League
of Nations was pushed into the foreground only after the publication of the
German edition of this book." Even in having 14 points in his program he
anticipated President Wilson, so that Dr. Scott pithily adds, "This little book
is therefore to all practical intents and purposes a commentary on the League
of Nations before its birth."
The argument of the book is briefly this. The great war shows that the
development of International Law must be on more radical lines than were
before thought possible or necessary; that its structure must be laid firmly on
a different plan; that this difference lies largely in the treatment of the law of
war. War should no longer be invested with the character of a legal institu-
tion, since war is really a negation of law. In the waging of war it is "not
legal institutions but the necessities of warfare that are the impelling motives."
War is self help. It does not fit into a system of International Law. 'When
force prevails, law does not prevail. War is not law." We should distinguish
between the two as sharply as possible. Here lies the future task of humanity.
"The development of procedure in international disputes appears to be the real
problem to be solved after this war." This is to be achieved by the creation of
a system of international judicature.
According to accepted international law there are three kinds of procedure in
international disputes: mediation, commissions of inquiry and arbitration. The
first is only a friendly endeavor; the second an inquiry into facts. Arbitration,
however, goes farther in being an attempt at judgment but with means of
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enforcement lacking. Now since under the Hague rules resort to arbitration
is optional, disputants may without more ado make use of self help to enforce
their claims. To preclude this temptation to help oneself, i. e. to resort to war,
arbitration must be made obligatory. In this dilemma the author proposes, first,
that mediation should be made obligatory also; and second, he emphasizes the
duties of states as well as their rights, and this includes neutrals. This involves
international solidarity, a peace bringing activity on the part of neutrals. How-
ever, from this general arbitral obligation Professor Nippold would reserve the
actual vital interests of the states. For these other ways of procedure would
have to be employed. The thirty odd so-called Bryan treaties are based on
these lines.
But this is not enough, for we need guarantees. The war has brought new
viewpoints. One is, that a small minority of states must not be allowed to
obstruct progress. The principle of unanimity in international conferences
should not prevail as at The Hague. Another viewpoint discards moral guaran-
tees and demands real guarantees, to enforce the observance of international law.
To secure these the author turns away from The Hague and insists that "those
states that desire serious guarantees for international adjudication must simply
organize among themselves and seek to further international law on their own
account. The day of false deference has forever past." This means a new kind
of League equipped with some form of coercive measures.
To the author before the war such coercion was abhorrent But he has
suffered a shock. Moral obligations are no longer enough. Treaties were broken.
The scrap of paper incident recurs to every one. The old basis for law between
states was confidence. Now that confidence is lacking, and we need compulsion.
What now are these real guarantees? Not military conquests, which never
find a place to stop, but something juridical. The basis upon which such real
guarantees rest is twofold: the solidarity of international law and the community
of states. Thus the author reaches his next step. "As soon as one arrives at
the point where an organic coercive protection of any sort is to be introduced
into international law, there is at once the need of a special organization. This
can only be in some sort of federation of states, an alliance, league, or whatever
name you may wish to give it."
When states with a will to peace actually co-operate and treat the preservation
of peace as a matter of universal interest, then will progress be possible. But
this federation need not include all states. It will be enough if it includes suffi-
cient states to make a would-be belligerent pause, to make the antagonism of
the states with a will to peace dangerous.
Then the author discusses sanctions, the means of keeping peace. This implies
the possession of force. After citing the methods of coercion put forward by
a great variety of writers, the author gives his own. He contemplates pledges,
an economic boycott, seizure of property, exacting an indemnity, a fine, retorsion,
reprisal, embargo, blockade.
Such means of self help when employed for selfish purposes are to be criticized,
but if used for the preservation of peace, are lawful. But behind all these as an
ultima ratio there should be coercive force, a police power.
When such solidarity of peace-willing states, thus armed, exists, there should
result the end of the race in armaments, the disappearance of militarism and its
mentality. And if paper agreements in respect to armament are distrusted,
guarantees in this direction also must be looked for; such as supervision of the
manufacture of arms, munitions, ships, etc. and the holding of forts. Procedure,
sanctions and coercion are briefly summarized in the fourteen points already
alluded to. To show the drastic nature of the author's plan, the last point is
quoted in full. "14. In case the employment of the above-mentioned economic
means of coercion should not be effective, or if circumstances should otherwise
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make it seem desirable, corresponding military measures would have to be added
to the above; such measures should prove so much the more effective, since the
league would not only as a matter of course represent a much superior force, but
since, in the future peace treaty, the war preparations of the individual power
should be reduced to a reasonable degree, so that no single state would any
longer be in a position to bid defiance to the might of the league. The observance
of the prescribed limits of armament on the part of the individual states would
of course have to be controlled in a suitable manner."
And as to non-league states, the author would apply league requirements, not
under contract obligation, but under the general principles of international law.
In other words the democratic majority' should uphold the rule of right as
against the militaristic states with their ideal of might.
Although Professor Nippold calls self help or war the negation of law, he
now goes on to discuss war law past and future. I have space only to indicate
briefly the range of his topics and their treatment.
"It is impossible still to regard war as a matter which only concerns the military
persons of the participating states." All belligerent subjects are affected by it;
commercial war lies parallel to military war and should gradually replace it.
Again he remarks that "modern technical science has conquered military warfare
and with it militarism itself. This is the great lesson of the war."
Through his league, the author conceives of the neutral interest as so dominant
that it can dictate the laws of war by land and sea and enforce them. No law
can be allowed to favor any particular state. Breaches of the law in the great
war must not be held to be precedents for future action. Yet the laws of the
future will vary much from those of the past. To impose one's will upon an
opponent is the object of war as it used to be, but this will be achieved largely
by economic means. Blockade should be retained; contraband must be more
strictly defined and not altered during war; abolition of prize capture is probably
impracticable; from sea mines innocent trade must be protected; submarine
warfare must be humanized; the same is true of aerial war; reprisals must be
done away with.
The demand for the freedom of the seas furnishes a text for a considerable
essay, exposing the German desire that it should mean unobstructed trade in time
of war. And for the observance of these laws the world needs guarantees,
coercion, as in case of solving international disputes. Here the power of the
league, the neutral, comes into play.
The reviewer has devoted his space to an attempt to portray Professor Nip-
pold's views rather than to a commentary upon them. They involve the jettison-
ing of opinions held before the war, on account of the occurrences of the war.
Is this altogether reasonable? Granting that the predominant militarism before
the war, particularly in one powerful state, was a menace to the peace of all
states; granting that violations of the laws of war, particularly by one belligerent,
were a blot upon civilization and a blow to the progress of International Law
during two centuries, what is the proper inference? Is it, as the author seems
to think, that we should surrender and charge much of what we had supposed
to have been gained, or is it that militarism is now being punished for its
excesses, that violations of law have beep followed by terrible penalties, social,
financial, governmental? In place of seeking new ways following a counsel of
perfection, is there not a good deal to be said, as Dr. Scott suggests in his intro-
duction, in favor of turning back to the orderly processes of growth of the
pre-war era, The Hague Conferences, the resulting Conventions, State individu-
alism rather than a super-state, holding fast to the achievement of the past




Enemy Property in America. By Arthur Garfield Hays. Albany, Matthew
Bender & Company, 1923. pp. xii, 396.
In this compilation, the author deals with those sections of the Trading with
the Enemy Act which relate to the seizure of the private property in the United
States of German, Austrian, and Hungarian citizens during the late war and with
the decisions which have construed the several sections of that Act.
Part I consists of a lightly annotated survey of the provisions of the Act, of
which section 9, providing methods, administrative and judicial, for the recovery
of seized property under certain circumstances, has been the subject of most of
the litigation. Part II deals with "the future disposition of enemy property" and
discusses the traditional American policy on this subject, the avowed purposes
and policy of Congress at the time the property was taken over, and makes cer-
tain alternative suggestions as to the disposition of the property. The author
favors the return of the property to its owners, as must every informed person,
it would seem, having any historical background of this subject, and an
economic or statesmanlike outlook on the future. It would have been interesting
had the author shown how two such unrelated subjects as the payment of,
American claims against the German Government and the returni of sequestrated
private property to its owners became tied together in the Knox-Porter Reso-
lution, notwithstanding the public declarations of Senator and ex-Secretary of
State Knox that "in order to follow our traditions and be decent this property
should be returned." (p. 365.)
Part III consists of an annotated reprint of the provisions of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, as amended. Part IV consists of a "Digest of reported and
unreported cases" under the Act, decided prior to February 1, 1923. Part V con-
sists of a reprint of the treaties of peace with Germany and Austria and of
those articles of the Treaty of Versailles (252, 253, 296-3o3) relating to the
disposition of private enemy property, "debts," "property, rights and interests,"
and "contracts, prescriptions and judgments."
An Appendix contains the so-called Winslow Amendment of March 4, 1923,
providing for the return of $io,ooo to each owner of sequestrated property, with a
brief explanatory note thereon, and a verbatim reprint of the committee reports,
majority and minority, accompanying that bill to the floor of Congress.
The sequestrated private property in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian
is one of the legacies of the late war. That Congress in 1917 intended merely to
prevent a hostile use of the property during the war and realized that interna-
tional law and American tradition required a return of the property to its
owners at the close of the war is made clear by the assurances of the gentlemen
in charge of the bill in October, 1917. But as the war progressed and property
came in, new ideas and temptations developed; and in the treaties of peace we
find an article that the private property may be retained until Germany and
Austria make "suitable provision for the satisfaction of American claims."
The foreign Governments have thus contingently signed away their rights,
and we are privileged, so far as they are concerned, unless provision is made
for paying the American claims, to adopt any policy we choose. The British
Government has just informed the United States that by art. 248 of the Treaty
of Versailles, the Allies have priority on all German public assets, and that
presumably Germany cannot validly promise to pay us anything. It is probably
realized by most students of internatioral law that any effort to use the private
property to discharge with it claims against the German and Austrian Govern-
ments would amount to the confiscation of private property; yet occasionally we
find articles like those of Mr. William Campbell Armstrong in the August number
of the American Bar Association Journal which seek to rationalize the taking of
the private property by attempting to show that the appropriation of this property
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by us would merely be the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the
foreign government, and if the owner is not fully compensated, that is the fault
of the foreign government and not ours. Mr. Armstrong's article is in effect a
brief which omits practically all reference to much of the literature, precedents
and historical material contradicting the writer's thesis. While many rules of
international law are confused or doubtful, the relevant rule in this case is
believed to be clear and certain. It is founded on a profound and rational
economic principle, the security of foreign private property. An impairment of
that principle could only be temporarily and seemingly profitable, for the effect of
the precedent would be likely to outlive this generation and would in the long
run jeopardize the institution of private property itself. That would be no con-
tribution to the progress of the race, or the nation, nor evidence practical wisdom.
It will be interesting to observe which road Congress will take in fixing our
final policy.
EDwr M. BoRcHAR.
Yale University School of Law.
Cases on Trade Regulation. By Herman Oliphant. St. Paul, West Publishing
Company, 1923. pp. xxi, io78.
It has frequently been observed that the interpretation of the rules and princi-
ples applicable to the conduct of business form a rather distinct branch of the
law. Recognizing this fact, many nations of Europe and of Latin America have
formulated codes of commercial law and not infrequently separate courts are
established to apply the special rules relative to commerce and business. Since
the merging of the law merchant with the general common and statute law of
England no such distinct branch of law has been recognized in Anglo-American
countries. That there is a basis in Anglo-American law for separate considera-
tion of cases and materials relating to certain aspects of business .relations is
the belief of the author of this casebook. Consequently he has presented a
unique collection of cases on the law which relates to certain efforts of courts
and legislatures to regulate the doing of business. An historical introduction
comprises extracts relating to the manorial system and the merchant and craft
guilds of the Middle Ages, the beginnings of government regulation of industry,
and the changes in economic conditions following the breac-up of the feudal
system, with a short survey of the industrial revolution and the growth of the
laissez-faire as an economic and industrial policy.
The cases are grouped under three headings: first, restrictive contracts involv-
ing contracts not to compete, concerning agreements to restrict the use of
skill or enterprise, restrictions accompanying the purchase of property or
involved in contracts apportioning business or tending to create a monopoly
or combination; second, competitive practices involving cases on the privilege
of competing and on practices involving intimidating and molesting, disparaging
competitors' goods, appropriating competitors' trade values or trade secrets,
inducing breach of contract, boycotting, exclusive dealing and various unfair
price practices and unfair methods of advertising; third, combinations with
cases dealing with the object and form of combinations, with efforts to regulate
combinations, and with the rights and liabilities under recent federal statutes.
A large part of the cases is concerned with the common-law rule that contracts
in restraint of trade and monopolistic contracts are contrary to public policy
and therefore void. The change in the rule as to contracts in restraint of trade
by which the restriction was held to apply only to a general restraint and to
permit a partial restraint for a certain time and place based upon a valuable
consideration is traced in detail through the case of Mitchell v. Reynolds (x7xl,
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K. B.) i P. Wins. i81, and numerous English and American decisions. In the
development of the distinction between general and partial restraints, the cases
indicate the growth of the rule of reason as applied to business relations through
which the courts were led to determine whether a covenant was wider than
necessary and whether contracts were (a) reasonable in extent, and (b) not
injurious to the public. It is shown that restraints interfering with livelihood
were usually held void, and that contracts involving a transfer of good will or
business prestige were usually upheld.
After a considerable number of cases tracing the development of the common-
law rule as to the validity of contracts in restraint of trade, the change in
economic conditions which resulted in a very important modification of this
rule is dealt with in the Nordenfelt case [1894, H. L] A. C. 535, wherein the House
of Lords frankly recognized that changed economic conditions warranted a
modification of the once restrictive common-law rule, and in the leading Ameri-
can cases such as the Diamond Match Company Case (1887) io6 N. Y. 473,
13 N. E. 419, in which the distinction between a partial and a general restraint
is made a farce by a qualifying clause deliberately intended to evade the old
rule. In these cases, agreements of a monopolistic character were upheld on
the theory that economic conditions warranted pretty largely a free and unre-
stricted competition and combination for business purposes.
The modern rule as developed by the courts appears to be to the effect that
"unless injury to the public manifestly outweighs public policies of honesty
and freedom from alienation," restrictive contracts as to sale of property and
to divide territory, etc., can be enforced.
The recent tendencies to hold competitive practices unfair which attempt to
injure a plaintiff's business and to condemn malicious interferences brings out
the fact that courts of equity are being called upon to prevent deception, fraud,
and misrepresentation in business dealings. Frequent statements of opinions
still show evidences of the former laissez-faire economic policy of favoring a
free competitive regime. On the other hand a principle is slowly being formu-
lated that equity will afford relief to uphold the principle of "common business
integrity."
A new development of the law relating to trade regulation is involved in the
effort of the courts to prevent a malicious or intentional breach of a competitor's
contract. The original rule in this matter laid down in Lumley v. Gye (1853,
Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216, has gradually been developed as a principle of English
law and has been introduced into many of the American states.
The cases presented in this volume deal with subjects which might in large
part be comprised under standard courses now offered in law schools dealing
with contracts and private corporations; but in neither of these courses is there
sufficient time or opportunity to deal adequately with the new principles and
problems involved. The result is that the development of many of the principles
and rules relating to modern business practices are either not referred to at all
or are very briefly treated in the standard law school courses.
Whether it will prove desirable to continue the standard courses on contracts
and corporations and merely to add another course dealing with the newer case
material organized on a functional basis or to attempt to revise the law curricu.
lum so as to add much of this new material in the standard courses is a problem
on which opinions will naturally differ. It will be difficult to find a place for a
new course in an already too extensive list of subjects for three years' work.
The author is to be commended for preparing a very interesting and useful
collection of source material. The development of commercial arbitration and
the growth of a business code through the courts, through administrative com-
missions such as the Federal Trade Commissions, and through various trade
boards established by commercial organizations, is developing a new type of law or
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giving a different content to old rules in relation both to a certain class of con-
tracts and of corporate relations. The increasing scope of state and federal
regulations in this field, as shown by not only the cases coming before the
couits but also by the activities of the Federal Trade Commission, indicates the
growth of a field of law which must be given greater consideration in the law
schools.
It is to be observed that the discussion of such a collection of cases without
the consideration of economic and industrial conditions and problems would
prove rather barren and fruitless. It seems that if a course on the law of trade
regulations is to be offered in the law school or in schools of commerce, there
must come along with this attempt an effort to secure better preparation on the
part of law teachers and students in economics and social conditions as a back-
ground for many of the court decisions which are frankly based upon public
policy as affected by modern economic and social conditions. And many trade
regulations will always be largely of an extra-legal character but so closely
related to legal rules and principles that these regulations can not be safely
ignored by the practitioner who wishes to serve as advisor and counsellor to
modern business men.
That a book of such unusual value is printed in a form so as to be extremely
difficult to use is to be regretted.
CHARLES GaovE HA NES
University of Texas Law School
A Selection of Cases and Other Authorities on Labor Law. By Francis Bowes
Sayre. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 19=. pp. xviii, 1o17.
A review of a new casebook in a recognized traditional field can assume the
reader's familiarity with previous work, and develop the compiler's point of view
in some detail. A review of an experimental venture in a new field must, on the
other hand, deal somewhat broadly with the material offered. Because of this
same lack of a standard of comparison this reviewer postponed writing until he
had taught the present book in course. Teachability is and remains the crucial
test for a casebook. Mr. Sayre's work comes through that test magna cum laude.
The book opens with 24 pages of English statutes on labor and labor contro-
versies, from the Ordinance of Labourers of 1349 to the Trade Disputes Act,
19o6, and the Trade Union Act, 1913. As a record of the changing of law to
meet changing conditions this series is impressive; and the text of the Trade
Disputes Act, i9o6, is of course vital to either an understanding of modern
English decisions or comparative study of the Clayton Act. There follow eighty
pages on conspiracy, restraint of trade, and the "right of association." In
these, as throughout the book, the compiler's effort has been effectively addressed
to setting the labor problem involved in its frame of like, or analogous, or
conditioning rules found in non-labor cases. Mr. Sayre's insistence on this
type of rather wide comparative study gives the book strength and value;
occasionally, as with the Mogul Steamship Co. case, it would seem as if mere
reference to the title would be enough, without seven pages of reprint; semi-
occasionally, as in the section on ownership by unincorporated associations, the
comparative matter seems inadequately analyzed and therefore diffuse; in all
but exceptional instances, however, it is well chosen and striking.
There follow thirty-five pages on federal jurisdiction over labor disputes,
which perhaps have some warrant for insertion at this point in that they get
Toledo, Ann Arbor, etc., Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co. and In re Debs before the
student early in the game. Save for that, one might believe this material to
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belong either in its due place in the general law on strikes and strike-torts, or
with the material on the use of injunction in labor disputes. Certainly as the
section is presented, the background of the Clayton Act is wholly lacking.
Then come a series of admirably arranged chapters on strikes. The compilerproperly considers first the privileged or tortious character of certain means
per se: strike, enticement, intimidation, peaceful persuasion, picketing (about
Ioo pages in all). Lockouts, the black list, and the union label, are shortly
treated; unionizing activities and boycotts more fully; the last is prettily
organized. It is not clear to the reviewer, as a matter of analysis, why the last
three of these heads are grouped as separate chapters apart from "means," and
postponed to the thorough i6o page study of "legality of ends pursued through
collective action" by labor organizations; nor why trade agreements should not
be included under "means." As a teaching device, however, the compiler's
arrangement is justified, if only because it permits study of the more compli-
cated problems of the boycott against a solid background of the legality and
relationship of means and ends as developed in the study of the strike.
The second "part" of the book-2oo pages-treats of unincorporated labor
unions in their internal and external property, right, and liability relationships.
The section on trade agreements is well built; the analysis is in other parts of
this section hardly as well sustained as elsewhere in the book. It would seem,
especially, that some material on the means of enforcing judgments (other than
injunctions) obtained by representation, would go far to round out this "part."
"Part III' appears offhand as something of a miscellany; the use of the
injunction against labor organizations (55 pages), the effect of the Thirteenth
Amendment (30 pages), regulatory labor legislation (6o pages), businesses charged
with a public interest as a possible special class (13 pages), compulsory arbitra-
tion and the industrial court, giving the constitutive laws with decisions there-
under from Canada and Kansas, and decisions from Australia and South Aus-
tralia (80 pages), in connection with which is an appendix on minimum wage
budget, and, finally, thirty-five pages on Workmen's Compensation. This can
perhaps be gathered under some such head as "direct governmental regulation
of labor disputes and conditions." In this "part" more than elsewhere one feels
the need of material outside the cases; the inclusion of the minimum wage
budget and constant well-chosen footnote references to non-legal material (see
especially p. 717) show the compiler's keen appreciation of this fact. One
would have wished for a treatment of regulatory legislation not so exclusivelydirected at determining legislative powers, and giving something more of the
economic aims of the statutes concerned. Aside from that, little criticism is
to be offered. The effect of the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the
Kansas court and the minimum wage, if available before publication, would
probably have led to slightly different arrangement and emphasis, but of what
casebook is the like not true?
On the whole, then, the material is well chosen, well presented, provided with
useful notes which do not make the attempt (almost hopeless in the labor field)
to be exhaustive, and unusually well indexed. If it almost exclusively stresses the
trade union phase of the labor question, it may find justification both in the
great factual importance of that phase and in the greater frequency of litigation
arising out of it.
Remains for consideration the matter of the place in the law curriculum of a
course such as the book proposes. In the normal course of events the offering
of such a course means, for the students who elect it, the displacement of somepresent standard course. It is possible to prevent overlapping of actual content
by so remodelling the work in torts, agency, partnership, equity, constitutional
law, etc., as to leave the labor problems in those courses uncovered. But such
an expedient does not solve the problem. The other courses concerned may
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narrow their scope pro tanto; they will only in extraordinary cases cut their
time allotment; some now standard offering will still be displaced. The reviewer
sees little harm in that. It should be recognized by this time that the substan-
tive content of a law course is fractional at best. The more we cover with
course and class work, the better; but our most is astonishingly small. A course
so built as to set sprouting in the student a realization that his information
gathering must be done independently is worth more than the time which the
giving of such a course consumes; and Mr. Sayre's cases challenge to such a
shaping of class work. The material equally with its arrangement challenges
likewise to study of the non-legal background against which the law is shaped;
to a perception of the fact and manner of growth and change in living law, by
court decision and by statute-a perception which must become clearer and
deeper where the time span over which changes occur is narrowed down as it is
here. By its striking value in this aspect, too, the course commends itself.
But the reviewer would go farther. There is no need to scallop the subject
matter out of the adjacent established courses. A cross-section view has value
of its own; an advanced and detailed study proceeds soundly only when a
general foundation has been laid. What reason in analysis or pedagogy is there
for admitting half a dozen advanced courses in specific fact-types of contract
and excluding from such study a like treatment of a specific fact-type of tort?
Such duplication may make the course a luxury to some three-year students.
But it would greatly enhance the gain to such as took it. And a teacher of
such matters as partnership and negotiable paper may be pardoned for not
believing their study on the road to the LL.B. essential to salvation in later
practice, if what is substituted for one of them combines almost inevitably
solidity of matter, analysis, cultural insight, and legal perspective.
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Cases Ilhstrating the General Principles of the Law of Contract. By John C.
Miles and J. L. Brierly. New York, Oxford University Press, American
Branch, i923. pp. xvi, 528.
This is a small casebook containing 79 English cases on the law of Contracts,
Agency, and Quasi-Contracts. It is intended to accompany Anson's treatise;
and its purpose, indicated in its title, is to illustrate the application of the rules
constructed by Anson. For such a limited purpose it will no doubt be very
serviceable. At least a third of the cases are contained in several American
casebooks on the subject. With only eight cases in Offer and Acceptance, three
on Statute of Frauds, seven on Consideration, three on Quasi-Contracts, and
next to none on Conditions, it is certain that much is left without illustration
and that the student is not afforded material sufficient for original and critical
comparative study. It seems certain that, just as in this country, the later
English casebooks will treat the law not as settled once for all by the masters
and the judges but as growing and changing with new life conditions, and will
give to the student an opportunity to do far more than to read Anson and then
prove he is right by means of a single case.
Ax uRn L. Com¢i
Yale University School of Law
